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The Strategic Compass: Entering the Fray 
Sven Biscop
The Strategic Compass for the EU’s security 
and defence policy, to be adopted in 2022, 
must generate immediate action. The best 
way of ensuring that is to prepare new 
capability initiatives and, potentially, new 
operational engagements now, so that they 
can be launched simultaneously with the 
Strategic Compass. In that light, “the 
development of an initial-entry force as a pool 
of Member State forces that train and exercise 
together and are made available to the EU” (as 
summarised in an EEAS working paper), is 
one of the most promising ideas on the table. 
How to make it work? 
 
The best way not to make an initial-entry force 
work, is to build it on the basis of the existing EU 
Battlegroup scheme. A battlegroup is what is left of 
a division that has twice been run over by the Red 
Army: thus General von Mellenthin’s definition in 
his World War Two memoir.1 A battlegroup, in 
other words, is an ad hoc force, thrown together 
from what forces are left after defeat or, in a 
positive scenario, purposely put together for a 
specific operation.  
 
The force that executed EU Operation Artemis in 
the Congo in 2003 was fit for purpose, but turning 
its scale (a reinforced battalion) and composition 
into a fixed format for all EU Battlegroups did not 
make operational sense. A Battlegroup is not always 
the right battlegroup: different contingencies 
demand different force packages, of different sizes, 
but those cannot be generated from a pool of a 
mere two “battalions-plus” on standby. Linking the 
idea of an initial-entry force to the Battlegroups, 
locks the EU into thinking small. For most Member 
States, the Battlegroup scheme entails no more than 
contributing a few companies, or even just a single 
company, every couple of years. If they are serious 
about the initial-entry force, they will have to think 
a lot bigger than that.  
 
BRIGADES AS BUILDINGS-BLOCKS 
In a non-paper earlier this year, 14 Member States 
(including France, Germany, Italy, and Spain) did see 
things bigger. They advocated a 5000-strong “first entry 
force”, “articulated around a brigade-size land component 
and a maritime component”, to “be enhanced with an air 
component and all necessary enablers” at a later stage. For 
ground operations, the ability to put together a brigade-
size force and deploy it at short notice would indeed 
provide the EU with a much broader range of options. 
The big risk, however, is that Member States, as usual, will 
interpret even this proposal in a minimalist way: as a call 
 
 





for the EU27 collectively to create a single multinational 
brigade for EU operations. That, frankly, would be 
useless.  
 
To start with, most EU Member States have a least one 
brigade in their armies (my own country, Belgium, 
included) – they do not need the EU to create one. 
Second, a single brigade can obviously deal with a single 
crisis, but it is not unduly pessimistic to assume that the 
EU will face simultaneous contingencies in its periphery. 
Third, a single brigade will never be fit to be deployed in 
all theatres, against all potential adversaries – that requires 
a variety of brigades, of different composition. Finally, 
more than an initial-entry force is needed, for the simple 
reason that in many scenarios in the European periphery 
any follow-on forces will also have to be provided by EU 
Member States, as US attention has shifted to Asia. As one 
brigade can only be deployed for 4 months at a time, 
sustaining a year-round deployment requires at least three.  
 
What is necessary, therefore, is a pool of brigades, a 
modular force package from which a force can be tailored 
for any specific operation, from training and mentoring to 
combat. In other words, a multinational corps, with 
national brigades as building-blocks.2  The difference with 
the Battlegroup scheme, apart from the scale, is double. 
On the one hand, this need not be a stand-by force that, 
during a stand-by phase, is available exclusively to the EU 
– there simply are not enough deployable forces in 
Europe to allow for this. Overall readiness of the 
constituent brigades must be such, however, that rapid 
deployment is possible. On the other hand, national 
brigades ought to be anchored permanently in the 
multinational corps, and participate in annual 
multinational manoeuvres. A Battlegroup, in contrast, is 
simply dissolved after its stand-by phase.  
 
The advantage of a permanent multinational corps are 
threefold. First, many national brigades are incomplete: 
they lack specific combat support and combat service 
support capabilities, which render them unemployable in 
many scenarios (think of a brigade without air defence, for 
example). A combination of pooling and specialisation at 
corps level can remedy this. Second, arms and equipment 
as well as doctrine can gradually be harmonised between 
brigades, increasing interoperability and rendering pooling 
and specialisation easier. Third, the corps can serve as the 
benchmark to quantify the need for strategic enablers. 
The states that contribute to the corps should acquire the 
necessary strategic enablers do deploy its brigades without 
having recourse to the assets of others. 
 
The CROC and the Headline Goal, and 
the 28th army brigade  
The template for such a scheme already exists, as a 
PESCO project: the EUFOR Crisis Response Operation 
Core (CROC). More Member States could join; for the 
moment Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and 
Spain have committed. More importantly, Member States 
must develop the CROC into an actual force, with 
identified brigades assigned to it, rather than regarding it 
merely as a tool for drawing up scenarios and catalogues 
of theoretically available forces.  
 
Conceived as a multinational corps composed of pre-
identified national brigades, the CROC would in effect be 
a new and realistic way of achieving the EU’s Headline 
Goal: a pool of 50 to 60,000 troops for expeditionary 
operations. Although overshadowed by the Battlegroups, 
the 1999 Headline Goal remains the official level of 
ambition. It also is the required level of ambition: in a 
strategic environment that sees near permanent instability 
in the periphery of Europe, while the US is increasingly 
focusing on Asia, Europeans will need the forces to 
underpin their diplomacy and to undertake crisis 
management and stabilisation outside Europe’s borders in 
any non-Article 5 scenario. An expeditionary corps, 
available regardless of the forces assigned to deterrence 
and collective defence, is a minimum.  
 
In fact, this corps could double as one of the three corps 
that NATO defence planning envisages. So the EU’s 
CROC would be a way (perhaps the only way) of reaching 
NATO targets, rather than an obstacle as NATO 









The CROC could also be the framework to operationalise 
the “28th army” that the German social-democratic party 
proposed in 2020. 3 What the SPD put forward, in fact, is not 
an army, but a brigade: a multinational unit recruiting from all 
EU Member States (similar to the French Légion Étrangère). 
For the reasons explained above, there would be little point 
in creating a single, free-standing brigade. As one brigade 
within a corps, however, what one might call “1st European 
Brigade” could be a worthwhile military and political 
experiment, and the potential nucleus of more truly 
European units.  
 
If a set of Member States now operationalises the CROC 
along these lines, then the time has perhaps come to close 
down the Battlegroups. The EU has never deployed a 
Battlegroup, and likely never will. Nevertheless, the 
scheme has been very useful in pushing capability 
development and multinational cooperation. Today, 
however, it has become an obstacle rather than a stimulus 
to further defence integration. Let us focus efforts on the 
CROC. 
 
COMMAND & CONTROL, PLANNING, AND 
STRATEGY  
For the CROC to be effective requires standing 
arrangements for command  & control. As regards the 
Operational Headquarters, strengthening the Military 
Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) within the 
EU’s own structures is already under discussion in the 
context of the Strategic Compass. In order to align the 
level of ambition with the proposed initial entry force, the 
MPCC ought to be able to conduct at least one, but ideally 
two, brigade-size operations simultaneously. Could 
Eurocorps be the standing Force Headquarters of the 
CROC and be developed into an “EU Land 
Headquarters”? For Eurocorps, this would be a return to 
the roots, when the participating states had assigned 
divisions and brigades to it, unlike today, when only the 
corps headquarters is permanent.  
 
A necessary complement, also already under discussion, is 
advanced planning. If Member States operationalise the 
CROC, the EU can further enhance its overall 
reactiveness by giving the EU Military Staff or the MPCC 
a standing mandate to undertake contingency planning, at 
its own initiative. Not just for fictional countries and 
generic scenarios, though, but for real military options in 
actual places where a crisis is developing that threatens EU 
interests.  
 
Finally, as the EEAS has rightly pointed out, the EU 
needs a strategic, interest-based narrative that clearly sets 
out when and where Europe must engage in military 
operations outside its borders in the first place. The EU 
and its Member States must above all be honest with 
themselves and stop pretending that the point of the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is to 
protect people in other countries. That can be a positive 
side effect of an intervention – but military action should 
only be considered when the European interest is directly 
at stake.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In recent years, the EU has been able to count on an 
effective rapid reaction capacity. It is called France. That is 
not a tenable situation, neither for France nor for the EU. 
Something must obviously be done. Not by warming up 
the debate about the Battlegroups once again. If Member 
States try to base it on the Battlegroups, the initial entry 
force will be dead on arrival.  
 
Going far beyond the debate on an initial-entry force, EU 
High Representative Josep Borrell recently emphasised 
the need for a 50,000-strong EU reaction corps. 4  In other 
words, the original Headline Goal. The Strategic Compass 
provides the opportunity to – finally – reach this goal. To 
grasp it, Member States must think big, and combine 
existing objectives, ideas, and half-started projects (the 
Headline Goal, the initial entry force, the CROC) into a 
single, concrete plan of action. 
 
Sven Biscop painted his last tin soldiers in 1998 and 
published his first journal article on European 
defence in 1999,. Twenty-two years later, in 2021 (the 
bicentenary of Napoleon’s death), Europe actually 










                       
 
Grand Strategy in 10 Words - A Guide to Great Power Politics in the 
21st Century (Bristol University Press, 2021). 
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